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and stimulating examples, and it has the virtue of brevity and good
indexing.
WILLIAM H. REMYt
THE GREAT PRICE CONSPIRACY. By John Herling. Washington:
Robert B. Luce, Inc. 1962. Pp. xv, 366. $5.50.
[N] o matter what General Electric's past [has] been in regard
to the observance of the antitrust laws, "our record for the past
decade and more indicates that the managers of the General
Electric Company are making earnest and successful efforts to
comply not only with the letter, but also with the spirit of the
antitrust laws.
As long ago as 1946 . . . the company embarked upon
an educational program, a program which has been continued to
date with undiminished vigor, designed to sharpen the sensi-
tivity and awareness of all our people to the role and importance
of the antitrust laws." [I]n 1958 . . . [the] Assistant At-
torney General in charge of the Antitrust Division . . . "cited
the General Electric Company as the 'number one example' of
companies which have made earnest efforts to live up to the
antitrust laws."'
These words were spoken by Ralph J. Cordiner, Chairman of the
Board of the General Electric Company during a May, 1959, appearance
before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly. They rep.-
resent the image projected by General Electric at the time of the first
public rumblings of "The Great Price Conspiracy," the revelation and
prosecution of which was to shake the electrical manufacturing industry
to its very foundations.
In compiling this history of the electrical industry's price fixing
scandal, the author, newspaperman John Herling has called upon many
sources for his information, including the individual defendants, ex-
ecutives of defendant corporations, the staff of the Senate Subcommittee
on Antitrust and Monopoly, officials of the Department of Justice, as
well as his fellow newspapermen. He utilizes, as could be expected, a
reportorial style, placing the main emphasis on the role of General Elec-
tric and its officials in the conspiracies.' The absence of any detailed le-
t Member Indiana Bar. Former Marion County (Ind.) Prosecutor. Former Presi-
dent, Indianapolis Board of Safety.
1. P. 54-5.
2. General Electric was involved in nineteen of the twenty conspiracies for which
indictments were returned, as was also true of Westinghouse, the other giant corporation
in the electrical industry.
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gal analysis3 makes the book of limited value to persons trained in the
law; however, it may still be recommended for the socio-economic im-
plications of its insights into the operations of the modern American in-
dustrial corporation and the personalities and attitudes of corporate ex-
ecutives involved in vast criminal conspiracies violative of the federal
antitrust laws. Although he labors under the disadvantage of writing
before all the facts and circumstances surrounding the conspiracies are
known and without the benefit of a detached historical perspective, Mr.
Herling seems to have presented an authentic account of the offenses.
He carries his narrative chronologically through the issuance of indict-
ments covering twenty conspiracies, the entry of pleas of guilty or nolo
contendere by the corporate and individual defendants, and the sentencing
procedure. However, he occasionally departs from a strict chronological
presentation of the conspiracies to turn his attention to some of the cor-
porate officials most deeply involved in or affected by the plots. This
technique results in a fairly successful attempt to present some of the
complexities of twenty conspiracies embracing different combinations of
electrical products, companies and officials.
Mr. Herling begins this modem morality play in May, 1959, when
the officials of the Tennessee Valley Authority complained of identical
secret bids received in connection with three contracts advertised to the
electrical industry. In fact, identical bids on electrical equipment con-
tracts had occurred in some twenty-four instances over a three year
period. As a result of the TVA announcement, the United States At-
torney General authorized the Antitrust Division's Philadelphia office to
begin a grand jury investigation of price fixing within the electrical in-
dustry, which had already been the subject of two such investigations
during the 1950s. Once begun, the grand jury proceedings advanced
rapidly. In mid-June, subpoenas were issued requesting documents to be
returned by the companies in mid-July. Then, as the facts of corporate
existence and activities emerged, individual subpoenas began to be issued.
In order to acquire knowledgable testimony the investigators granted im-
munity to conspirators who were not considered sufficiently important in
the overall conspiracy to be saved as defendants in the approaching in-
dictments. From this chain of witnesses came the outlines, and then the
details, of numerous conspiracies designed primarily to fix prices, and
3. For example, the twenty indictments are described only in general terms; they
are in no place set forth verbatim. Nor are the conspiracies themselves described in
sufficient depth to aid the legal scholar. There is almost no discussion of the Sherman
Antitrust Act and the legal principles which have evolved in court decisions interpreting
it.
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also to control the submission of rigged price bids and allocation of
business.
The indictments, most of which were issued during the first six
months of 1960, were far-reaching, shocking the electrical companies and
the public. The investigation had become too much for one grand jury
by November, 1959, and before the indictments were completed, five
grand juries had been appointed. With each indictment covering a sep-
arate product, the first seven, which were handed down February 16 and
17, charged fourteen electrical manufacturers4 and twenty-eight of their
officials with conspiring to fix prices and bids and divide markets in
selling power switchgear, oil and circuit breakers, low-voltage power
circuit breakers, bushings, lightning arrestors, insulators, and open fuse
cutouts to government agencies and private industry. The annual sales
involved in the conspiracies were 270 million dollars, or more than 1 bil-
lion dollars for the entire period of the conspiracies. The government
charged that, as a result of the conspiracies, prices of electrical equipment
were maintained at "high and artificial levels," price competition was
eliminated, and purchasers did not enjoy the "benefits of free competi-
tion." The later indictments covered power switching equipment, navy
and marine switchgear and isolated phase buses (50 million dollars an-
nual sales); power, distribution, network and instrument transformers
(500 million dollars annual sales) ; and industrial control machinery (262
million dollars annual sales).
The author examines the operations of three typical conspiracies, al-
though perhaps not in as great a detail as the reader might desire since
this is one of the most fascinating portions of the story. The description
of the industrial control equipment conspiracy provides a picture of meet-
ings between representatives of supposedly competing electrical companies
during a six year period. Several times the conspirators agreed to raise
prices ten percent. The talks ranged over such subjects as the effect of
prior price increases, uniform cash discounts, competition from non-
conspirators, and even the marketing of new products. It is readily
apparent that, despite the meetings, the conspirators remained suspicious
of each other. Nor was the conspiracy completely effective as at nearly
every meeting there were complaints about price-cutting and renewed
efforts to obtain adherence to the prices set at the meetings.
In the condenser conspiracy, a two level operation was revealed: The
basic pricing policy for the entire industry was established in infrequent
"high level" meetings of executives and managerial personnel while the
4. Some of the smaller companies were named as co-conspirators, but not as de-
fendants.
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lower-level managerial personnel implemented the pricing policy in
"working-level" meetings held every six to eight weeks. The conspirators
controlled the published prices of condensers, which they agreed to raise
four times in less than three years. Additionally, the working level group
discussed and set bid prices and bid positions for the various companies
for upcoming (specific) condenser jobs. If the conspirators were un-
able to decide through discussion which company was to be given the low
position for a job, then the decision was made by lot.' During many of
the "working-level" meetings, so-called "bitching" sessions were held,
during which representatives of corporations which had not respected the
position of the designated low bidder on a prior job were criticized and
admonished.
While the basic significance of this book lies in the spectacle of the
so-called "captains of industry"-men ostensibly committed to the preser-
vation of the competitive free enterprise system-engaging in wholesale
violations of the antitrust acts," the author devotes a major portion of
his narrative to the issue of the innocence of the top corporate officials
and the sharp conflicts arising within the defendant corporations. It is
characterized by the manner in which the top executives of General Elec-
tric strove to save themselves while consigning the managerial executives
to face punishment in the federal courts for the antitrust offenses. The
struggle within General Electric, which first came to the surface before
the indictments were returned, centered around the following men: Ray-
mond W. Smith, a Gneral Electric vice-president and general manager of
the transformer division; William S. Ginn, a General Electric vice-
president and general manager of the turbine division; Arthur F. Vin-
son, General Electric group vice-president; Robert Paxton, president of
General Electric; and Ralph J. Cordiner, chairman of the General Elec-
tric Board of Directors. The former two, division managers under
General Electric decentralization program, were indicted for antitrust
violations by the Philadelphia Grand Juries, while the latter three, mem-
bers of the top executive group of General Electric, escaped prosecution.
When it became apparent during the grand jury investigations from
sources outside the General Electric Company that there had been price
discussions between competitors in the electrical manufacturing industry
5. In most of the conspiracies, the market for a product was allocated between the
conspirators on a percentage basis, thus providing guidance in the award of specific jobs.
6. Chief Federal Judge J. Cullen Ganey, during the hearing on sentencing, called
the offenses "a shocking indictment of a vast section of our economy" which has "fla-
grantly mocked the image of that economic system of free enterprise which we profess
to the country and destroyed the model which we offer today as a free world alternative
to state control and eventual dictatorship." P. 195.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
with employees of General Electric participating, the top executives drew
a sharp line between the " 'sinful' general managers and . . . the vir-
tuous executives. . . " The participants in the meetings with competi-
tors were demoted and given cuts in pay for their flagrant violations of
General Electric's policy directive 20.5,' while the top executives retreated
behind 20.5, denying any participation in the conspiracies or any knowl-
edge of their existence.
Raymond Smith's reaction to his prospective demotion was an angry
resignation. While he admitted his offenses, he claimed that he was do-
ing nothing more than following tacit company policy. In Smith's own
words:
When I took over as general manager of transformers on
January 1, 1957, Cordiner told me that neither I nor my people
should have any dealings with our competitors. I accepted this
statement as well as the written declaration in the re-publication
of Company Policy 20.5 in the light of my knowledge of the
methods used in the switchgear area where I was employed from
1940 to 1947, and in the transformer area where I was em-
ployed from 1947 on. . . . To my knowledge . . . during the
entire period from 1940 through 1956, it was common practice
in both of these areas to discuss prices and other competitive
matters with competitors. . . . I was also aware that similar
practices were being followed not only in other areas of the com-
pany, but also in other companies in the electrical manufactur-
ing industry. . . . In other words . . . although the General
Electric Policy 20.5 regarding antitrust practices had been is-
sued in 1946, it had been constantly disregarded in major areas
of the company with, at least, the tacit approval and agreement
of the managers and the officers of the company at the time
responsible for those areas.'
In contrast to Smith's strong reaction against his superiors, William S.
7. The provisions of policy directive 20.5 of the General Electric Company, which
had been in effect since 1946, are as follows:
It is the policy of the company to comply strictly in all respects with the anti-
trust laws. There shall be no exception to this policy nor shall it be compro-
mised or qualified by anyone acting for or on behalf of the company. No
employee shall enter into any understanding, agreement, plan or scheme, ex-
pressed or implied, formal or informal, with any competitor, in regard to
prices, terms or conditions of sale, production, or distribution, territories or cus-
tomers; nor exchange or discuss with a competitor information; nor engage in
any other conduct which in the opinion of the company's counsel violates any of
the antitrust laws.
8. P. 31.
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Ginn, whose numerous violations of the antitrust laws were also beyond
question, accepted his demotion quietly and continued in the employ of
General Electric Company. He remained the organization's man.'
During the period of the conspiracies, Robert Paxton, like Smith
and Ginn, was advancing through the ranks of General Electric corporate
management. Prior to assuming the presidency in 1958, he had been a
key executive in the switchgear and transformer divisions which were
later revealed to be deeply involved in the price conspiracies. In his testi-
mony before the Kefauver Committee, Mr. Paxton admitted that, while
he was marked as a man who did not "understand" and would not be-
come "personally involved" in meetings with General Electric's competi-
tors, he was aware that such meetings were occurring. Yet he did not
investigate or report to his superiors the possible antitrust violations be-
cause he felt this to be "tale-bearing," "womanish" and personally "dis-
tasteful." He forcefully denied Raymond Smith's assertion that he had
knowledge of the meetings. Mr. Herling's reaction to Paxton's denial of
complicity is strong: "Since Ray Smith was a close friend of Paxton,
and a man who in effect had followed in his footsteps in the transformer
division, Paxton's ignorance strained belief."'" In other words, Robert
Paxton maintained a pose of aloofness calculated to escape legal, if not
moral, responsibility.
The innocence of the top executives of General Electric was the key
issue underlying the fight by the corporation's attorneys to secure the
dismissal of the charges against Arthur F. Vinson in connection with the
switchgear conspiracy. Vinson, who served as the link between General
Electric President Paxton and Board Chairman Cordiner and the mana-
gerial executives, had been indicted on the basis of the testimony of two
vice-presidents and two general managers of General Electric. They al-
Iged that, in addition to having full knowledge of the meetings with com-
petitors, Group Vice-President Vinson had specifically directed them to
participate at a time when it appeared that the conspiracies were due to
collapse because of a failure of some companies, most notably Westing-
house, to cooperate. The government's case against Vinson was based
primarily upon a luncheon meeting in a dining room at General Electric's
Philadelphia plant he was alleged to have held with his four accusers,
three of whom were themselves under indictment. The General Electric
lawyers developed evidence which tended to show that Vinson could not
have been in Philadelphia on the days which the government alleged in a
9. Following the trials, William S. Ginn's resignation was requested by Ralph J.
Cordiner along with those of other General Electric executives receiving jail sentences.
10. P. 47.
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bill of particulars that the meeting probably took place. The Justice De-
partment attorneys were caught in a dilemma. The dropping of the in-
dictment against Vinson could appear to be contrived, yet the presenta-
tion of the evidence of his alibi-some of it being testimony from dis-
tinguished officials in the Eisenhower administration-might confuse
the jury and jeopardize the government's case against General Electric.
This was true even though the testimony of his subordinates at General
Electric was persuasive despite their inability to recall exact dates. More-
over, General Electric, which was the only corporate defendant who had
not offered a guilty plea, had indicated that it would plead guilty or nolo
contendere to the charges if Vinson's name were dropped from the in-
dictment. It was under these conditions that Robert A. Bicks, Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, reluctantly recom-
mended that General Electric's terms be met
The attorneys for General Electric, not satisfied with the behind-the-
scenes victory in the negotiations, requested a statement for the record
from the Government attorneys. Thus, after Justice Department Attor-
ney Charles Whittinghill moved that the charge against Vinson be volte
prossed, Gerhard Gesell of Covington and Burling, representing General
Electric, said "Before pleading in this case, inasmuch as this is the only
one of the cases involving General Electric where there have been any al-
legations concerning the company's board of directors, I would like to
ask the government if they have a statement they wish to make with
respect to that before I plead.""
Whittinghill then read the following statement:
In response to the request of General Electric, the government
makes this statement: The government has not charged and
does not claim that any member of the General Electric board
of directors, including Mr. Ralph J. Cordiner and Mr. Robert
Paxton had knowledge of the conspiracies pleaded to in the
indictments, nor does the government claim that any of these
men personally authorized or ordered commission of any of the
acts charged in any of the indictments. 2
General Electric thereupon entered pleas of guilty and nolo con tendere to
the various indictments.
During the hearing on sentencing, Chief Federal Judge J. Cullen
Ganey, the presiding trial judge, gave his opinion of the positions of the
high General Electric executives in an unusual statement:
11. P. 163.
12. P. 164.
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[The court] is not at all unmindful that the real blame is to be
laid at the doorstep of the corporate defendants and those who
guide and direct their policy. While the Department of Justice
has acknowledged that they were unable to uncover probative
evidence which could secure a conviction beyond a reasonable
doubt of those in the highest echelons of the corporations here
involved, in a broader sense they bear a grave responsibility for
the present situation for one woudd be most naive indeed to be-
lieve that these violations of the law, so long persisted in, affect-
hzg so large a segment of the industry and finally, involving so
many millions upon millions of dollars, were facts unknown to
those responsible for the conduct of the corporation and, ac-
cordingly, under their various pleas, heavy fines will be im-
posed.
3
Finally, in regard to the individual defendants, Judge Ganey stated
that he was "convinced that in the great number of these defendants'
cases, they were torn between conscience and an approved corporate pol-
icy, with the rewarding objectives of promotion, comfortable security and
large salaries-in short, the organization of the company man, the con-
formist, who goes along with his superiors and finds balm for his con-
science in additional comforts and the security of his place in the cor-
porate set-up."" Judge Ganey's comments, made in February, 1961,
offer a sharp contrast to the statement of Ralph J. Cordiner before the
Kefauver Committee less than two short years before.
Mr. Herling leaves little doubt about his opinion concerning the at-
tempt to maintain the reputation of General Electric's top executives un-
sullied. In regard to the statements made by Gesell and Whittinghill in
court, he states:
Both these statements have since been widely used by General
Electric as evidence that the government had cleared their top
company officials of any wrongdoing. Top Justice Depart-
ment officials regard this as an abuse of the government's state-
ment. . . . [T]he government speaking through Whittinghill
did not state that General Electric's directors, board chairman
and president did not have knowledge of nor authorize the
power switchgear conspiracy. The government merely said "it
did not charge or clain that those individuals did have such
knowledge or did give such approval." . . . Nevertheless, Gen-
13. P. 196.
14. Ibid.
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eral Electric sought to explain to its stockholders that it pleaded
guilty and nolo contendere to the antitrust indictments "only
when it appeared that the company would be held legally re-
sponsible for what had been done by a few officers and em-
ployees, in spite of the innocence of the directors and top man-
agement." The misleading impression was thus created that a
government stamp of innocence was placed on the anxious brow
of General Electric's summit leadership.
The government might not be able to prove legally the in-
volvement of the "highest corporate echelons" but the govern-
ment would not and did not assert that the top corporate eche-
lons were ignorant of the violations being committed in their
company's midst."
Mr. Herling provides a good description of the crucial battle by the
Justice Department's attorneys to prevent the electrical industry antitrust
cases from following the pattern of earlier antitrust cases. Antitrust
criminal prosecutions had settled into a generally followed pattern in
which the defendants plead nolo contendere-or sometimes guilty-after
which they receive moderate fines. Prison sentences were the exception
rather than the rule, while the fines were considered merely a cost of suc-
cessfully doing business. As the author states it: "the violation of the
antitrust law never was considered more than a gentlemen's misdemeanor
-and a gentleman was never sent to jail for violating the antitrust law."'0
An advantage of the plea of nolo contendere over a plea of guilty from
the defendant corporation's standpoint, in addition to and arising from
the fact that it is not an admission of guilt, is that, in any subsequent
civil suit concerning the same facts, the former plea would require com-
plete proof of the offense from the plaintiff while the latter would not.
The critical point was reached during March, 1960, after the issue
of the first seven indictments, when some of the smaller defendant cor-
porations, including Allis-Chalmers and I-T-E Circuit Breaker, offered
pleas of nolo contendere. General Electric and Westinghouse entered
pleas of not guilty and awaited the outcome of the maneuvers of their
co-defendants. The government attorneys forcefully opposed the ac-
ceptance of the pleas of nolo contendere, the decisions on which lay en-
tirely within the discretion of Judge Ganey. Assistant Attorney General
Bicks personally appeared in the Philadelphia courtroom to present the
Government's contention that the pleas should be rejected. He argued
15. P. 164-5.
16. P. 9.
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that the offenses were the most serious in the history of federal antitrust
legislation, that the public interest demanded the defendants not be per-
mitted to submit to criminal punishment and then deny their guilt in later
civil suits, and that the plea of nolo contezdere does not bear the same
imputation of moral turpitude as a plea of guilty or a conviction. Bicks'
position was effectively supported by an "unprecedented" affidavit from
Attorney General William P. Rogers which detailed the steps in one of
the conspiracies, indicated the clear "guilty knowledge" of defendants'
representatives, and pointed to the importance of this ruling in setting a
pattern in regard to the pleas of other more important conspirators in
these and companion cases. In a major victory for the Justice Depart-
ment and an ominous warning for the defendants, Judge Ganey rejected
the offered pleas. Within a short period, the management of Allis-
Chalmers not only decided to plead guilty, but also to completely reveal
to the Justice Department its involvements in the conspiracies through
documents and witnesses. Suddenly the government found itself able to
fill in its evidence for many of the cases in return for which Allis-
Chalmers hoped for leniency in the final disposition of its cases. In the
end, after all twenty indictments had been handed down by the grand
juries, the government attorneys, after long and tedious negotiations with
the many attorneys representing the corporate and individual defendants,
required guilty pleas from the most culpable offenders in the seven most
important cases while accepting nolo contendere pleas from the other
defendants.
Even though the antitrust cases were marked by tense and dramatic
struggles throughout, the author's account of the hearing on sentencing
is not anticlimactic. The sentences adjudged fell heavily upon the as-
sembled defendants. The twenty-nine companies involved were fined
more than 1.9 million dollars, nearly half of which was levied on General
Electric and Westinghouse. Of the fifty-two individual defendants,
thirty were given jail sentences although only seven actually went to jail
for thirty days. The remainder received suspended sentences with long
periods of probation. All received heavy fines. The violation of the
federal antitrust laws would no longer be known as a gentleman's
misdemeanor.
All in all, the author has presented an interesting, general report of
the electrical industry antitrust violations of the 1950s, one which should
prove informative to most readers with no great expertise in the antitrust
field of the law. WILLIAm[ H. ANDREWSt
t Associate, Evens, Baker & Barnhart.
